Motives for Emperor Napoleon's movement on Brienne. The surprise of Lanskoy was enough to show the population they had too quickly counted on their loss, and the operation of Brienne was, in the heart of the Emperor, used to prove the need for the marshals to take courage, that we had not run out of resources and, with judgment and resolve, affairs could still be restored.
That is why, without losing a minute, he used the 28th to march on Brienne. Besides, when he stopped at that resolution, the weather was frosty, his army was full of enthusiasm, his artillery well mounted, and by this road through the forest, he could be in at Brienne in two marches. The last only has a certain critical value, but it should be noted that by moving on Dienville, he would have been forced to march almost in sight of the troops of the IIIrd Corps, and again, completely sacrifice the most important factor: time.
Finally, there was still a morale consideration that Napoleon had decided to try and end this one of his opponents, he considered, rightly, as the most formidable and most difficult, because of the his hatred of France and the activity that, despite his advanced age, he put at the service of his passion.
Droysen, in his Life of Field Marshal Yorck , speaks about it as follows: "It was clear we were on the eve of major events, the dispositions of the population were completely changed in a moment. The arrival of Napoleon and his proclamations had aroused their patriotism. The news that the Emperor had taken the offensive, had revived their spirits and hopes. The villages were emptied and the inhabitants, with their cattle and their food, took refuge in the woods, including watching the stragglers and small patrols, ambushing them, disarming them and slaughtering them.
In the cantonments, the crimes and assassination attempts multiplied. It was now impossible to be deceived for a moment longer about the spirit of the people: the real war had started. It was this victory that he hoped to find at Brienne. His apologists well say that on receipt of the report in which Lanskoy informed him of the events in Saint-Dizier, he had acted wisely in only recalling to him immediately the cavalry that he had detached; they have a good claim that in awaiting battle formation for the enemy to attack on the days of 28 and 29 January he was merely complying with this great principle that we must first compel the enemy to deploy, while concealing carefully one's own plans and not make a final resolution, a decisive one, that is completely fixed when the intentions of his adversary are unknown, it is nevertheless indisputable that he thought at first to make a simple offensive reconnaissance of the French, when he received, 28 January, at 6 in the morning, the news that the enemy had driven Lanskoy from Saint-Dizier and had continued until beyond Eurville-Bienville.
